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Abstract: This article investigates how the European Social Fund (ESF) is being employed 
to translate Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals on employment into domestic agendas. The emphasis 
is not only on how European priorities are taken into account by ESF national programming 
documents (talking the EU talk), but also on how these priorities are translated into concrete 
actions at the local level (walking the walk). This article pursues this emphasis by combining 
mainstream  studies  on the impact  of Europe (top-down Europeanisation) with studies  on 
political usages (usages of Europe). This combination reveals new dynamics at work, such as 
the usages by Europe, and gives a more complete picture of the implementation process. 
Empirical evidence is drawn from documentary and database analysis and from interviews 
carried out at the European level and in two member states (France and Spain). 
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Introduction 
Since the beginning of the economic crisis, budgetary reforms have been at the top of the 
agenda for most European Union (EU) member states. The future of Europe 2020’s social 
dimension is more uncertain than ever, since social policies have become among the most 
frequent adjustment variables. In this unpropitious context, there are still ways to effectively 
implement the social dimension of Europe 2020. Reliance on European financial instruments, 
and particularly the European Social Fund (ESF), is one of the most promising ways. The 
ESF has indeed been identified as a crucial factor in accelerating, amplifying and triggering 
national changes in line with the European Employment Strategy (ESS) (Weishaupt 2009). 
Ever since the design of the first European Employment Guidelines in 1997, their link with EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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European financial instruments has been reinforced. The alignment of Europe 2020 with the 
Structural Funds is also expected to be further developed in the next programming period.
1  
Despite much interest in the so-called ‘Lisbonisation of Structural Funds’,
2 the few studies on 
this topic (Hartwig 2007; Mendez 2011) — in line with mainstream research on Structural 
Funds — focus on European institutional arrangements and programming documents. When 
the translation of Structural Funds into domestic agendas is also investigated, it has been 
shown  that  even  modest  ESF  funding  can  bring  significant  domestic  policy  shifts 
(Verschraegen,  Vanhercke  and  Verpoortenet  2011).  The  impact  of  soft-governance 
instruments such as the ESS on sub-national actors is increased when it is accompanied by 
material  incentives  such  as  the  ESF  (Lopez  Santana  2009).  In  this  line,  many  relevant 
questions  on  the  contribution  of  the  ESF  to  implementation  of  European  goals  remain 
unexplored. How are Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals translated into domestic agendas through the 
ESF? How can these goals get to be reflected in EU programming documents? How can they 
be translated into concrete actions at the sub-national level? 
These questions only get partial answers in recent literature focused on the Structural Funds. 
To be sure, the connection between Lisbon/Europe 2020 and Structural Funds breathes new 
life into the analysis of Structural Funds. Since 1988, the Structural Funds have imposed a 
common regulatory framework on member states for the implementation of cohesion policy, 
often analysed as a case of multi-level governance (Marks 1992). While many conceive of 
cohesion policy as a case of intergovernmental relations (Pollack 1995), some scholars argue 
that member states’ influence has been exaggerated (Bachtler and Mendez 2007). With this 
focus  on  the  power  balance  between  the  European  Commission  and  member  states,  the 
politics of the Structural Funds have been oversimplified. Attention has almost exclusively 
focused on budgetary matters, intergovernmental negotiations, macroeconomic impact and 
institutional arrangements. At the beginning of the 1990s, some studies did take domestic 
contexts into account but focused only on how EU cohesion policy affected the redistribution 
of power within member states (Hooghe 1996). As Bachtler and Mendez conclude, ‘there is 
inadequate understanding of the interplay between key actors and insufficient appreciation of 
how this interplay varies at different stages of the cohesion policy design/implementation 
process’ (Bachtler and Mendez 2007: 558). This neglect of the micro-level is significant 
since, according to Smith, when attention is drawn to the local level, ‘orthodox accounts of 
multi-level governance are of little assistance’ (Smith 1997: 724).  
This article emphasizes the complementarity between the so-called orthodox and the micro 
approaches to the use of the Structural Funds. Most mainstream research is too distant from 
sub-national realities to make practical sense, but microanalysis alone is also too parochial to 
capture the full picture. While most research on Europeanisation is based on a top-down 
research design (Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009), studies on the usages of Europe propose 
instead a bottom-up sociological perspective with a strong empirical focus (Woll and Jacquot 
2010;  Graziano,  Jacquot  and  Palier  2011).  Usage  of  Europe  has  been  defined  as  ‘social 
                                                 
1 Interview with a policy officer at the Commission (horizontal unit). See also: ‘Future of Cohesion Policy 
Sparks EU Row’, published 24 August 2010 by Euroactiv, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/regional-
policy/future-cohesion-policy-sparks-eu-row-news-497081 (last consulted on 24
 June 2013).  
2 This expression refers to the use of Structural Funds for the implementation of the Lisbon strategy.  EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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practices that seize the European Union as a set of opportunities’ (Woll and Jacquot 2010: 
116). Based on a micro-sociology of the EU, the usages of Europe approach proposes an 
actor-centred and contextualized account of European processes.  
The present study seeks to help bridge the gap between mainstream institutional analysis and 
EU sociology (Saurugger and Mérand 2010; Favell and Giraudon 2009). Even if different 
scholars hold contrasting views of new institutionalism, they all tend to consider institutional 
development  as  among  the  most  relevant  factors  in  shaping  political  life.  In  this  paper, 
institutions are understood as an ‘organized setting within which modern political actors must 
typically act’ (March and Olsen 2005: 4). Legislative and executive branches, as well as 
bureaucracies and electoral systems, are typical examples of formal institutions. In line with 
sociological analysis, informal institutions are also included. Sociological analysis also places 
the emphasis on social practices and claims to provide explanations that are more realistic 
and concrete. The combination of mainstream institutional analysis and EU sociology not 
only allows for a broader and better-grounded picture of the implementation process, it also 
draws  attention  to  analytical  dimensions  that  are  usually  left  out,  such  as  the  usages  by 
Europe,  which  are  the  usages  by  European  actors.  Providing  such  a  combination  is  a 
challenging task. But it is made more feasible by the present study’s focus on a well-defined 
empirical issue: to what extent the ESF is being employed to translate Lisbon/Europe 2020 
goals  into  domestic  action.  After  a  brief  introduction  to  the  current  controversy  on  the 
contribution of the Structural Funds to Lisbon/Europe 2020, this article presents the research 
design and methodology in detail. Then, the analysis reconstructs the entire implementation 
process of Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals through the ESF.  
1. Analysing the contribution of the European Social Fund to the Lisbon Strategy 
One of the main difficulties in assessing the contribution of the ESF to the Lisbon Strategy 
and to Europe 2020 is the complexity and changeability of both governance architectures. A 
few words on the latest studies on this topic are crucial before proceeding to the presentation 
of the analytical framework.  
1.1. The European Social Fund and the Lisbon strategy: Conflict or overlap?  
The Lisbon strategy was launched in 2000. It included a new approach to EU governance, the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC). In the domain of employment, the OMC integrated 
the European Employment Strategy (EES), designed to coordinate the employment policies 
of the member states on the basis of the new provisions laid down by the Amsterdam Treaty. 
When the Lisbon strategy was re-launched in 2005, the main novelty was the fusion of the 
European Employment Guidelines with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines into the 24 
Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. The reviewed strategy was criticized for its weak 
social dimension and for its unbalanced governance architecture (Zeitlin 2008). The new 
design for Europe 2020 addresses some of these imbalances, reinforcing the social dimension EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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and  fostering  the  involvement  of  local  authorities  and  non-state  actors  (Zeitlin  2010). 
However, Europe 2020 has also been aligned with the Stability and Growth Pact through the 
creation of the European semester
3 and, in a context of crisis, this new mechanism has been 
used to increase fiscal surveillance and to prevent macro-economic imbalances at the expense 
of the social and environmental dimensions (Pochet 2012). 
During the revision of the Lisbon strategy  in 2005, emphasis was also placed on the 
implementation gap, and the ESF became a key financial mechanism in support of the EES. 
The link between the ESF and the Employment Guidelines can be found in the Council 
regulation establishing priorities for the Structural Funds for the 2007 -13 period (European 
Council 2006). 
The governance of the Structural Funds is complex, not only because it involve s several 
levels of governance, but also because it is divided into multiple stages governed by different 
rules and actors (Marks 1992). A first phase, dominated by member states, is aimed at 
creating a budgetary envelope. The institutional arrangements fo r disbursing the funds are 
designed at a second stage, within the framework of ordinary legislative procedure. The third 
phase concerns structural programming and, contrary to the two previous phases, decisions 
are taken in bilateral negotiations between the Commission and member states. As Structural 
Funds are a form of co -financing, the responsibility for their implementation is shared 
between the Commission and member states. Member states appoint the managing and audit 
authorities, set up monitoring committees and introduce the necessary checks and controls. 
The Commission is responsible for monitoring the programme, but its specific prerogatives 
depend on the EU rules for each programming period. 
The alignment between the Lisbon Strategy and the ESF has  not been adequate (European 
Commission 2010). The ESF is considered to be much broader in scope, as it is formally 
linked to European social policy  (Hartwig 2007). For example, the  ESF can fund the 
institutional capacity of public bodies, which is not included in the Employment Guidelines. 
There are also some goals covered by the Employment Guidelines that cannot be funded by 
the ESF (e.g., reforms of the tax system). Despite these contradictions, most of the objectives 
of both instruments of governance ov erlap. Thus, even in the past, when there was little 
formal integration between the Lisbon Strategy and the Structural Funds, the latter were 
already contributing to the former.  
Some provisions of the current ESF regulations are also considered to restrict this alignment. 
Cohesion rules often prevail in the process of the definition and attribution of funds at the 
expense of the social objectives of the ESF. The separation of the ESF from other funds is 
currently under discussion, but it is very unlikely i n the short-term (Yung 2011). Different 
policy cycles for the Lisbon/Europe 2020 objectives and the ESF are also seen as an obstacle. 
Europe 2020 was launched officially in March 2010 by the Barroso Commission, while the 
ESF regulation was not replaced by a new one until 2013. Thus, the ESF will first be able to 
take account of Europe 2020’s new priorities and targets in 2014.  
                                                 
3 During  the  ‘European  semester’  (six-month  period  from  the  beginning  of  each  year)  member  states  are 
expected to align their economic and budgetary policies with the EU rules. A set of procedures and rules have 
been designed to this purpose. More information available at http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/making-it-happen/, 
(last consulted on 24 June 2013).  EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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1.2.  Combining top-down Europeanisation with the usages of Europe 
Most studies on Europeanisation adopt a top-down research design, in which the absence or 
presence of domestic change is explained by the level of fit (or misfit) between EU-level 
policies  and  those  of  the  member  states  (Exadaktylos  and  Radaelli  2009).  European 
institutions and rules are considered the most relevant explanatory variables, while domestic 
institutions  are  considered  as  either  intervening  or  mediating  factors  (Borzel  and  Risse 
2003).  Those  studies  have  been  criticized  for  their  excessive  focus  on  institutional 
constraints  at  the  expense  of  other  relevant  factors  (Woll  and  Jacquot  2010;  Graziano, 
Jacquot  and  Palier  2011).  In  response,  research  on  the  usages  of  Europe  proposes  an 
alternative  perspective  and  research  design.  Researchers  in  this  camp  first  track  major 
changes at the national level and then try to assess the contribution of the EU. Their studies 
focus on the political work of individual actors and they also strive for more contextualized 
approaches to the impact of Europe. The EU is not seen as the driver of change but rather as 
a  selective  amplifier  (Visser  2005).  However,  it  is  often  difficult  to  see  how  the 
microanalysis of domestic usages fits into the broader European picture, and it is not always 
clear to what extent the usages of Europe lead to broader European impact.  
The confrontation of top-down Europeanisation with the usages of Europe approach (see 
Table 1) reveals one significant dynamic overlooked until now: usages by Europe. Usages by 
Europe  refers  to  actions  carried  out  by  European  policy  officials  in  charge  of 
implementation.  Lisbon/Europe  2020  goals,  even  if  they  are  broad,  can  still  make  a 
difference  if  they  are  championed  by  European  political  entrepreneurs,  namely  the 
Commission. Such political entrepreneurs can contribute to the specification of these goals 
and to their incorporation in national policy documents.  
   EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Table 1: Different approaches to the study of the impact of Europe 
  Top-down Europeanisation  Strategic usages 
Approach  Institutional analysis  Usages approach 
European level  EU pressures  Usages by Europe 
Domestic level  Mediating factors  Usages of/by Europe 
Major factor explaining 
change  Institutional arrangements  Strategic/political action 
Secondly, the  combination of  institutional  analysis and the usages  approach broadens  the 
scope  of  research  findings.  Each  approach  excessively  emphasizes  a  single  explanatory 
variable;  that  is,  Europeanization  emphasises  institutions  while  the  usages  approach 
emphasises actor’s agency. The present study takes into account both explanatory variables, 
which  are  not  mutually  exclusive  and  more  importantly,  not  always  easy  to  distinguish 
(March and Olsen 2005).  
The complexity of the processes at work calls for a holistic view that includes all the inter-
dependent  variables acting in  a  given  context. Following  an  INUS  approach to  causation 
(Mahoney and Goertz 2006), this article aims at identifying causes that are jointly sufficient 
for an outcome. INUS (Insufficient and Non-redundant parts of Unnecessary but Sufficient
4) 
causes are not individually necessary nor individually sufficient. On the basis of previous 
research, several variables – presented in Table 2 - that have been related to European impact 
will be analysed.  
   
                                                 
4 An example of an INUS condition is a short-circuit that caused a house fire. The short-circuit is insufficient 
because it cannot cause the fire on its own and it is non-redundant because without it the rest of the conditions 
are not sufficient. A short-circuit is just a part of a sufficient cause including other background conditions (e.g. 
oxygen, etc.) but this sufficient cause is not necessary since a different cluster of conditions could also have set 
the fire.  EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Table 2: Conditions shaping the impact of Europe 
  Conditions leading to EU impact 
 
Examples of other relevant 
factors 
Talking the EU talk    Detailed targets/goals 
  EU officials ‘ideology’ 
  Receptiveness  
  Favorable local context  
  National preferences 
 
Walking the walk     Detailed goals 
  Facilitators/ mediating 
factors 
  Monitoring capacity 
  Self-interest 
  National preferences  
  Ideological 
preferences  
  Legitimacy needs  
A first set of variables becomes relevant at the moment in which Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals in 
the field of employment are taken into account in ESF programming documents (talking the 
EU  talk).  First,  the  Lisbon/Europe  2020  goals  may  have  limited  the  policy  options  and 
courses of action in the process of negotiation. They may also have reinforced the idea that a 
specific  policy  line  is  necessary,  which  is  consistent  with  a  policy  process  framework 
approach (Lopez Santana 2006). 
Commission officials may also tend to push for the realisation of Commission priorities if 
their behaviour is shaped by what has been referred to as ‘European ideologies’ (Smith 1996). 
In this situation, Commission officials would insist on promoting a Community added-value 
and thus, they would push more for the implementation of Commission priorities.  
The efforts of Commission officials may also be eased by the receptiveness of the member 
states. When there is a policy misfit, domestic officials may be more or less receptive to 
European demands. A congruence between the views of European and domestic officials may 
also be the result of a learning process at an earlier stage (Lopez Santana 2006). Finally, the 
local  context  is  also  highly  relevant.  Even  if  the  local  context  includes  many  different 
variables, the emphasis in this paper is placed on the levels of economic development and 
centralisation, further discussed in the next section. In less economically developed member 
states,  the  implementation  of  certain  Commission  goals  may  not  be  appropriate  or  even 
possible. Thus, Commission officials may accept policy solutions that are not in line with 
Commission’s priorities.  
   EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Thus,  the  ideal  situation  in  which  there  would  be  a  maximum  of  chances  to  integrate 
Lisbon/Europe  2020  goals  in  domestic  documents  would  be  characterized  by  highly 
European,  ideologically-oriented Commission  officials  willing to  use  European  goals  and 
targets to push for changes that encounter little or no resistance from member states and few 
or no obstacles derived from the domestic context.  
The second part of this article examines the variables that help translate European priorities 
into concrete action (walking the walk). Previous research on this topic has concluded that 
unambiguous  European  pressures  leave  less  room  for  domestic  accommodation  (Borras  and 
Radaelli 2011). ESF goals should be detailed and specific to ensure that the policy options of 
domestic actors are effectively restricted. European impact has also been considered to be 
eased  by  the  presence  of  facilitating  factors  (Börzel  and  Risse  2003).  These  can  be 
institutional factors such as formal institutions or multiple veto points or change agents (e.g. 
norm  entrepreneurs).  Facilitating  factors  are  often  presented  as  sufficient  conditions. 
However, even if formal institutions may provide actors with resources to exploit European 
opportunities, these opportunities may not necessarily be exploited. One would expect that 
usages by Europe also take place at this stage of the policy process, if Commission officials 
have  some  chance  to  push  for  changes.  This  would  be  possible,  for  example,  if  the 
Commission has sufficient monitoring capacities.  
When these conditions are not met, usages by Europe are not likely, and/or the usages of 
Europe do not necessarily lead to European impact (or added value). For example, domestic 
actors will tend to use the ESF to pursue their own self-interest, ideological preferences, or to 
increase their legitimacy. When domestic institutional pressures to use the ESF in a specific 
way are strong, the actors in charge of the implementation will have less room to develop 
their own political usages and national priorities will become more relevant.  
1.3.  Overcoming single-level studies: The use of multi-level empirical data 
The  empirical  data  in  this  paper  serve  to  illustrate  how  this  combination  of  approaches 
improves our understanding of the implementation of  Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals, thereby 
contributing  to  theory  refinement  in  this  field.  Our  purpose  is  to  provide  an  in-depth 
understanding of a complex process and an adequate explanation that takes local as well as 
national context into account (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Comparing two member states 
serves to demonstrate the significance of domestic institutions and rules, as well as to identify 
similarities and illustrate the diverse use of EU rules in very different national contexts. The 
countries  compared,  Spain  and  France,  have  very  different  economic  and  institutional 
backgrounds, providing some leverage to suggest that any similarities that will be identified 
are  generally  with  respect  to  ESF  politics.  These  countries  also  vary  across  a  few  key 
variables relevant for the analysis of the local context, namely the degree of centralization 
and the level of economic development. The maximum variance approach as a strategy for 
the selection of cases will help to clarify the relevance of these contextual circumstances for 
the process and outcomes (Flyvbjerg 2006).  EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Despite  a  first  wave  of  decentralisation  in  1982  and  some  moves  towards  a  market-
oriented economy (Vail 2010), French dirigisme is still more the rule than the exception. 
In sharp contrast, Spanish regional authorities have acquired a considerable amount of 
autonomy since the democratization process in the late 1970s. When Spain joined the 
European Communities, most of its regions had a GDP less than 75% of the EU average. 
It was then considered to be under-developed and economically weak. Accordingly, since 
1988, it has been the main beneficiary of Structural Funds in absolute terms and, in spite 
of the last enlargement, has managed to maintain its overall level of funding in the current 
programming period (Douglas, Murillo, Delgado and Méndez. 2009). For Spain, the ESF 
represents 11 billion euros for the programming period 2007-2013, of which 8 billion 
come from the EU (70.5%). By contrast, metropolitan France, one of the ‘rich countries’, 
has  never  been  entitled  to  receive  money  for  convergence  purposes  and  receives 
substantially less money from the ESF (4.49 billion euros).
5  
When it comes to the translation of the ESF into concrete actions, the sub -national level 
also has to be taken into account.  The data for the analysis of the French and S panish 
domestic  implementation  processes  come  from  four  regions:  the  Spanish  regions 
Catalonia and Extremadura and the French regions Pays de la Loire and Limousin. These 
regions differ greatly in terms of economic development and, in the case of Spain,  the 
regions also have very different competencies.  
Empirical data are derived from different sources at different levels of governance. While 
analysing ‘talking the EU talk’, key data come from the analysis of European goals and 
domestic operational programmes (2007-13). The analysis of usages by Europe is based 
on semi-structured interviews
6 with key Commission officials working for the horizontal 
and geographical units at DG Employment.  While addressing ‘talking the EU talk’, the 
primary  focus  of  the  analysis  is  the  EQUAL  programme.  The  78  EQUAL  projects 
implemented in the four regions have been systematically analysed. Detailed information 
on each one of these projects is available in the EQUAL
 database.
7 The analysis of the 
usages  of  Europe  is  also  based  on  a  total  of  12  semi-structured  interviews  with  ESF 
officials at the national level and in these regions.  
   
                                                 
5 These figures are available on the ESF website: http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home.jsp?langId=en (last consulted on 
24 June 2013). 
6 Three interviews were carried out at DG Employment (one with a representative of the horizontal unit and two 
with representatives of the geographical units for each one of the countries under analysis).  
7 EQUAL is a Community programme implemented during the programming period 2000 -2006. It aimed to 
tackle discrimination and disadvantages in the labour market. It is   not possible to analyze a more recent 
Community programme since  there is no equivalent to EQUAL in the current programming period. The data 
analyzed come from the EQUAL database. Data was retrieved on the 18
th March 2009. An outdated version of 
the  database  is  available  online  at  http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/ECDB/equal/jsp/index.htm  (last 
consulted on 24 June 2013).  EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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2.  Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals in national programming documents: Talking the 
EU talk?  
At the decision-making and programming stage of the policy process,  the Lisbon/Europe 
2020 objectives are defined and in principle they should be incorporated into domestic policy 
documents. The reconstruction of the process presented herein reflects not only on the nature 
of European pressures,  but also on the usages  by Europe during the negotiation process, 
giving a more complete picture of the dynamics at work at the European level.  The first 
section shows that the broad Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals do not give a general policy direction, 
which is clearly reflected in the way member states and regional authorities allocate the ESF 
money. However, it cannot  be concluded that these  goals  have no influence whatsoever. 
Section two shows that European priorities can still be advanced by the Commission under 
certain favourable conditions.  
2.1.   A prioritisation process much more national than European 
As  Lisbon/Europe  2020  goals  reflect  the  commitment  to  respect  national  diversity  while 
constructing social Europe (Goetschy 2003), they are broad and do not really formulate clear 
priorities (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 2006; Meyer, Linsenmann and Wessels 2007). In the case 
of  the  ESF,  the  goals  that  are  actually  advanced  are  interpreted  and  specified  by  the 
Commission. The long list of priorities included in Europe 2020 has been reduced by the 
Commission to a series of specific measures for employment, included in the Annual Growth 
Survey for 2010 (European Commission 2011). The Commission opts for a balance between 
flexibility  and  security  and  for  getting  the  unemployed  back  to  work.  Measures  that  are 
promoted include the avoidance of benefits dependency, the reduction of dropout rates, and 
ending the overprotection of workers with permanent contracts. During the Lisbon period, the 
Commission also expressed a strong preference for adaptability measures in the domain of 
employment (Hartwig 2007). The EQUAL programme had a stronger social dimension since 
it was also expected to contribute to the objectives of the strategy to combat discrimination 
and  social  exclusion.  While  defining  the  ESF  priorities,  the  Commission  has  not  only 
inspired by the Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals, but also by the principles of assistance of the ESF 
regulation, such as the partnership and additionality principles. 
Many studies on this topic conclude that in the domain of employment, mainstream ESF is 
subordinated to national priorities and that the EU did not play a very significant formulating 
role (Verschraegen, Vanhercke and Verpoortenet 2011; Hartwig 2007, Goetschy 2003). The 
evaluation  report  commissioned  by  DG  ECFIN  reaches  similar  conclusions:  most  people 
interviewed considered prioritization as a national issue and the Lisbon guidelines were not 
considered to be very useful in this respect. Even in the case of cohesion policy, where the 
language of Lisbon has been prominent in domestic programming documents, the guidelines 
have been translated very differently (Mendez 2011). 
   EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Our  findings  tend  to  confirm  previous  research  on  this  topic.  Table  3  reveals  the  great 
diversity  in  the  allocation  of  funds  by  priority  in  the  current  operational  programmes  in 
France and Spain. Across the board, only a small proportion of funds was used to promote the 
European priority of adaptability. In Spain, where operational programmes are elaborated at 
the regional level, the regional differences are also striking. Thus, the Lisbon/Europe 2020 
goals  do  not  seem  to  give  a  general  direction  which  can  be  clearly  identified  in  the 
programming  documents  and  that  could  eventually  lead  to  a  process  of  convergence. EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Table 3: Distribution of funds by priority in the Operational Programmes 2007-2013 
  France  %  Spain  %  Catalonia  %  Extremadura  % 
1. Adaptability  898,911,778  19.90%  2,207,669,944  27.40%  70,175,382  24.65%  76,050,085  30.41% 
2. Employability  1,274,606,474  28.36%  4,474,859,732  56.00%  140,350,763  49.30%  67,624,205  27.04% 
3. Human capital  1,755,845,348  39.00%  1,143,652,056  14.00%  45,112,746  15.80%  106,061,387  42.41% 
4. Transnational cooperation  389,984,305  8.70%  112,673,018  1.00%  20,050,109  7.00%  -  - 
5. Technical assistance  175,216,070  3.90%  120,074,072  1.00%  9,022,549  3.20%  350,120  0.14% 
 Total  4,494,563,975  100.00%  8,057,328,822  100.00%  284,711,549  100%  250,085,797  100.00% 
ESF funds in euros, without taking into account national contributions. 
Source: Elaborated by the author
8 
                                                 
8 This Table has been elaborated from figures from the operational programmes in France, Catalonia and Andalucia. These operational programmes are available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/esf/home.jsp (last consulted on 24 June 2013). The operational programmes from Catalonia and Extremadura are available at  
http://www.empleo.gob.es/uafse/es/programando/programasOperativos/index.html (last consulted on 24 June 2013).  EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Instead of designing their ESF operational programmes on the basis of the Lisbon guidelines, 
member states seem to base their choices on domestic priorities. As explained by a French 
official ‘The ESF serves to fund the French employment policy. The central state first reaches 
an agreement with the different occupational fields. Then, the ESF division is approached to 
see which activities can be co-funded’.
9 In Spain, where the regions have significant room to 
manoeuvre, certain priorities are defined at the regional level. Regional officers do not have 
direct contact with Commission officials and they may not perceive the Lisbon guidelines as 
relevant. As a Catalan official responsible for the ESF points out: 
‘The Lisbon objectives are very broad. Almost everything fits these objectives, and 
they are not something that we take into account on a daily basis. (…) The change 
of government has an impact on priorities; in the last seven years we have had a 
socialist government that has introduced a lot of changes.’
10  
However, ESF-funded activities may still bear the mark of the various ESF-conditionalities 
and formatting. Domestic preferences may also be influenced by the Commission’s policy 
preferences at an earlier stage of the policy process. Existing research shows that European 
prescriptions  influence  domestic  policy-makers,  especially  at  the  stage  of  policy 
(re)formulation  (Lopez  Santana  2006).  Even  if  Lisbon/Europe  2020  goals  do  not  offer  a 
general direction, the ESF is not necessarily a less effective policy tool. As will be shown in 
the next section, the Commission’s interpretation of Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals can still be 
reflected  in  ESF  operational  programmes  when  they  are  taken  up  by  European  policy 
entrepreneurs.  
2.2.  The Commission’s strategic role: Usages by Europe 
Even  when  Lisbon/Europe  2020  goals  are  ambiguous,  if  these  are  championed  by 
Commission officials, they may still be reflected in the ESF policy documents. The evidence 
collected  shows  that  the  factors  that  actually  enable  the  Commission  to  use  the 
Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals strategically are combined in very different ways. There is ample 
evidence that Commission officials used the Lisbon goals and targets to push for changes in 
both cases. In France, Commission officials were more engaged with the promotion of a 
European  added-value.  Their  actual  impact  was  mainly  constrained  by  the  resistance  of 
national officials, who wanted to use ESF money to pursue domestic priorities. In Spain, 
Commission officials seemed less ideologically European, but they also had more room to 
push for changes since there was less resistance from domestic officials. In Spain, the main 
obstacles were related to an unfavourable domestic context.  
Lisbon goals and targets were used by the Commission as arguments during the negotiation 
process to push for action at the domestic level. As one Commission official pointed out,
11 
when targets are set at the EU level, it is very difficult for member states to ar gue that ESF 
                                                 
9 Interview with a French official at the French Ministry of Labour (ESF division). 
10 Interview with a Catalan official responsible for the ESF management. 
11 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (Horizontal unit). EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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money should not be used for this purpose. In addition, whenever an action falls outside of 
the Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals, the Commission has real power to block it (Verschraegen, 
Vanhercke  and  Verpoortenet  2011).  Country-specific  recommendations,  even  if  they  are 
often criticised for their ‘political’ character, are also used by Commission officials to push 
for reforms or to ensure the allocation of funds for specific goals.  
Our interviews confirm that Commission officials hold very different views of their own role. 
Like officials working at the French desk, some officials are inspired by a European ideology 
and place more emphasis on the Commission’s priorities. A Commission desk officer trying 
to promote such a European ideology argues as follows:  
‘If we want the ESF to have added-value, we have to be visible and so we need to 
concentrate the money. The French wanted to use ESF money for education but we 
will not do that because our money would not make any difference. The national 
French budget for this area is huge. The Commission tries to reduce the number of 
priorities in order to make a difference. (…) We have to make a difference on 
priorities and on quality. We need to have added value. We want to go where 
member states do not want to go by themselves.’
12 
Other officials, such as ones working at the Spanish Desk in this case, are more vulnerable to 
institutional pragmatism or even to ‘national capture’ (Hooghe 1996: 2012). Thus, they push 
less for the integration of the Commission’s policy preferences. For example, one of the 
Commission officials interviewed affirmed ‘The one who best knows a country’s problems is 
the  country  itself’  and  that  the  ‘ESF  actions  are  not  the  only  ones;  they  should  be 
complementary  to  member  state  actions’.
13 This  Commission  official  limited  her  role  to 
technical implementation of the ESF (making sure that expenses were eligible). Even if the 
Commission priorities were equally emphasized, this Commission official affirmed that ‘in 
the end the decision is that of the member state’.
14  
The receptiveness of member states is also a very relevant factor. Congruence between the 
ideological position of the member state and the position of Commission officials facilitates 
the negotiation process. The outcome also depends on the negotiating power of the member 
state. In the Spanish case, the last negotiation process (programming period 2007-2013) was 
considered to be easy since there was no fundamental disagreement about the definition of 
the problems and about the appropriate measures to deal with them. According to a European 
official ‘We want the same kinds of things; the only thing is that the Commission would like 
to do them faster’.
15 This congruence may be explained by an EU influence at an earlier stage 
of the policy process. As highlighted by Lopez Santana ‘the EES has highly influenced the 
stage of policy definition in Spain’ (Lopez Santana 2006: 487). 
In France, however, there was a fundamental disagreement about priorities. The Commission 
wanted  to  allocate  more  funds  to  adaptability  while  the  French  government  preferred  to 
direct  ESF  funds  to  fighting  social  exclusion.  Thus,  the  negotiation  process  was  very 
                                                 
12 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (French desk). 
13 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (Spanish desk). 
14 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (Spanish desk). 
15 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (Spanish desk). EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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complex
16 and many meetings were needed to reach a final agreement on the French 
operational programme.  
Finally, Commission officials also have to adapt to domestic contexts.  The Lisbon/Europe 
2020 guidelines are seen as important, but as one Commission official puts it, ‘Even if a new 
document  has  been  adopted,  this  does  not  mean  that  our  problems  will  change’.
17 Each 
geographical  unit  at  DG  Employment  adapts  Commission  priorities  to  the  sub-national 
context by taking into account their own analysis of the labour market. Even if EU desk 
officers would like to promote Commission priorities, certain contextual factors such as the 
economic crisis or extremely high rates of unemployment can bring them to accept (or even 
promote) measures that are in contradiction with the Commission position: ‘…in Spain there 
are some areas where the rate of unemployment is 40%. In this case, we accept any kind of 
measures  to  foster  employment  including  direct  support  to  business  for  the  creation  of 
temporary contracts’.
18 Commission officials refuse to use ESF money for this purpose in 
other Spanish regions where the rates of unemployment are not so high.  
3. The translation of the European Social Fund into domestic agendas: Walking 
the walk? 
Even if European priorities are reflected in the ESF operational programmes, their actual 
implementation in the territories is still not ensured. In this section, the combination of factors 
that are necessary to ensure European impact and thus implement Commission’s goals will be 
examined. Secondly, it will be shown how broad goals, which are typical of mainstream ESF, 
lead to usages of Europe in line with the agenda of individual actors or domestic preferences.  
3.1. When usages by/of Europe lead to EU impact 
The ESF serves to implement Commission priorities when a combination of INUS conditions 
is  present;  for  example  the  existence  of  precisely  defined  priorities,  the  presence  of 
facilitating factors and effective monitoring capacities.  
3.1.1. Goals that clearly reflect Commission’s priorities and give a clear-cut 
direction  
In  contrast  to  the  all-encompassing  Lisbon/Europe  2020  goals  or  the  objectives  of 
mainstream ESF, certain goals supported by the EQUAL programme reflected Commission 
priorities more clearly. This was possible because Community programmes such as EQUAL 
were directly designed  by the Commission  (Hartwig 2007). Thus, even if member states 
could still pursue a pick-and-choose strategy, they had to select among a narrower range of 
priorities. Table 4 shows that in all regions under analysis with the exception of Limousin, 
                                                 
16 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (French desk). 
17 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (Spanish desk). 
18 Interview with a Commission official at DG Employment (Spanish desk). EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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two-thirds  of  the  projects  (around  65%)  selected  the  broad  priorities  employability  and 
entrepreneurship. In Limousin, local actors were less involved, which may explain why there 
was more room for the implementation of specific Commission priorities.  
According to local actors, EQUAL contributed to the introduction of new issues in around 
one-third of the cases. It is likely that these cases correspond to the one-third of the projects 
that implemented specific priorities. The Commission priorities that had a stronger impact in 
Spain  were  the  most  specific:  gender  equality  and  the  diffusion  of  new  technologies 
(ECOTEC  2006).  EQUAL  contributed  to  the  integration  of  the  following  into  French 
employment  policies:  objective  3E  on  life-long  learning  and  objective  4  on  equal 
opportunities (Ministère des Affaires sociales and COM 2005).  
Table 4: Number of projects and type of priorities 
  Catalonia  Extremadura  Pays de la 
Loire 
Limousin 
 
Number of 
EQUAL 
projects 
31 out of 389  
in Spain 
(7.8%*) 
20 out of 389  
in Spain 
(5.14%) 
15 out of 451  
in France 
(3.3%) 
6 out of 451  
in France 
(1.3%) 
Type of 
priorities and 
projects 
7 out of 11 
projects (64%) 
selected broad 
priorities  
6 out of 9  
projects (67%) 
selected broad 
priorities 
 
10 out of 15 
projects 66.7%) 
selected broad 
priorities 
3 out of 6  
projects (50%) 
selected broad 
priorities 
  *Percentages refer to the total amount of projects implemented in the member state. 
Source: Elaborated by the author from information from the EQUAL database.  
The existence of detailed priorities is just the first stage of the transformation process and is 
by no means sufficient. Project managers are asked to do something that they would not do 
otherwise and do not know how to do.  
3.1.2. Domestic and European facilitators  
Facilitators can be found both at the European and domestic level. The appropriation of the 
EU  by  domestic  actors  to  advance  their  own  agenda,  also  known  as  leverage  effect,  is 
emphasised  by  the  usages  of  Europe  approach  (Graziano,  Jacquot  and  Palier  2011).  For 
example, some members of the Conseil Economique et Social in France elaborated a detailed 
report on lifelong learning inspired by EU discussions. This report supported the organization 
of awareness-raising activities on this topic and proposed specific measures adapted to the 
French educational system (Conseil Economique et Social 2001). In the Pays de la Loire, this EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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report was later used by the association CARIF-OREF to expand its activities through the 
implementation of an EQUAL project in the region.
19  
Technical assistance has also played a key role in both countries even if it has taken very 
different administrative forms (a department within the government in Spain and a semi -
autonomous agency in France). The role of these institutional facilitators and their interaction 
with domestic actors is often overlooked. 
Technical assistance can be activated by project managers willing to take advantage of 
European opportunities. For example, in Spain, a large proportion of EQUAL funds were 
allocated to gender equality (30%). Even if funds were available to design projects on this 
topic, the potential project managers did not have the required skills. Thus, they asked the 
UAFSE  (Unidad  Administradora  del  Fondo  Social  Europeo-UAFSE),  which  is  the 
administrative body in charge of the technical assistance in Spain, to provide a toolkit and to 
organise training workshops on gender equality.
20 Even if RACINE, the autonomous body in 
charge of ESF technical assistance in France, also received demands from project managers, 
the capacity-building process was not particularly bottom-up during the EQUAL period. The 
priorities that were  promoted the most  were those supported by the central state or the 
Commission.  
3.1.3. Effective monitoring capacities 
The Commission can also push effectively for change, but only if it has at its disposal an 
effective  monitoring  capacity.  The  2006  ESF  Regulation  gives  the  Commission  the 
possibility to sanction member states through several procedures such as the interruption of 
payments and financial corrections. But the Commission cannot argue that the funds have not 
been properly managed if the goals are unspecified or if there are no independent evaluations. 
Unlike some other programming instruments, EQUAL meets these requirements. Evaluation 
reports had to be drafted by external services selected on the basis of a call for tenders. 
When  sufficient  monitoring  capacities  were  available,  the  Commission  used  midterm 
evaluation  reports  to  push  for  the  implementation  of  specific  priorities.  For  example,  in 
France, the Commission issued a recommendation to integrate measures to promote gender 
equality more consistently on the basis of the French midterm evaluation report (Ministère 
des Affaires sociales and COM 2005).
21 Thus, France was obliged to organise workshops and 
seminars to raise awareness on this topic, and only after these additional efforts was the topic 
taken  into  account  by  organisations  active  in  the  employment  field.  RACINE  took 
responsibility for developing didactic material on equal opportunities and promoted this topic 
within the regions. In sharp contrast, the Spanish midterm evaluation report did not  identify 
any significant gap in the implementation of specific prioritie s (ECOTEC 2006). Therefore 
the Commission did not need to play a similar role.  
                                                 
19 Interview with an EQUAL project manager (Pays de la Loire). 
20 The guide is available at  http://mzc.org.es/formacion/docs/herramientas/guia_perspectiva_genero_equal.pdf, 
last consulted on 24 June 2013.  
21 Interview with a programme manager at RACINE (Paris). EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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3.2. Usages of Europe without EU impact  
Certain objectives in the employment domain, such as employability and entrepreneurship, 
are usually framed in such a broad way that they do not give a clear-cut direction. Thus, the 
content of specific actions is defined by the ideology or preferences of the project managers. 
As expected, this section shows that when sub-national actors are granted greater autonomy, 
as is the case in Spain, it is easier to bypass the preferences of the central state.  
3.2.1. Variation across countries: The relevance of domestic institutional 
background 
In both France and Spain, the responsibility for the management of the Structural Funds is 
shared between the central state and the regions. In Spain, sub-national authorities and private 
actors are given certain flexibility in the use of central funds (Lopez Santana and Moyer 
2012).  The  autonomous  communities  have  their  own  operational  programmes  (managing 
40% to 65% of the total amount of funds depending on the topic). In France, the regions can 
also obtain global grants of up to 40% of the total amount of funds allocated for use in the 
region. Even if both countries have adopted this mixed system, the pervasive centralisation of 
the French administrative traditions and rules leads to much stronger national pressures in 
this country.  
The prominent role of the French central state as gate-keeper is shown through two factors: 
the complexity of national administrative rules and procedures and the dispersion of funds 
(Balme and Jouve 1996;  Smith  1997).  First,  given the complexity of  French rules, local 
officials  need the support of national  officials  ‘trained and selected on  the basis of their 
capacity to master complex bureaucratic procedures’ (Smith 1997: 718). The French central 
state has its own specific national expertise on regional planning. This expertise has been 
developed  since  1963  by  an  inter-ministerial  department,  the  DATAR  (Délégation 
interministérielle à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’attractivité régionale).  
Second, the dispersion of funds in France has prevented the empowerment of local authorities 
and thus, it has been much easier for the central state to maintain its central position. The 
French central government is involved in the wide-ranging distribution of funds at minute 
levels, which maintains central authority but can be inefficient. In 2007, for example, the 
French government signed 2,462 different contracts with some 350 intermediary bodies.
22 In 
the  same  year,  Spain  declared  47  intermediar y  bodies,  which  implies  about  half  the 
administrative paperwork. Thus, in 2007, Catalonia received an envelope of 76 million euros 
to implement its own operational programme, while in 2010 the French region Pays de la 
Loire was responsible for the implementation of 4 ESF projects covering 21 million euros for 
all projects. In France, many funds are also managed by the regional offices of the National 
Agency for Employment (e.g. ANPE -Pays de La Loire was given 38,6 million euros in 
2007).  
                                                 
22 A  Commission  official  interviewed  referred  to  300  intermediary  bodies,  while  there  were  350  in  2010 
according to Yung (2011). EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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The French pervasive centralisation through the dispersion of funds is also reflected in the 
Community programme EQUAL. While in France EQUAL funds were scattered among a 
great variety of actors, most of the funds in Spain were spent or distributed by sub-national 
governments.  According to  the EQUAL database, 185 out  of a total  of 229 partnerships 
(80,8%) in Spain were coordinated by public organisations while in France only 38 out of 
256 project coordinators (14,8%) had this legal status. The pre-eminence of public bodies in 
Spain is explained by the difficulties that other entities experienced in raising sufficient cash 
flow to assume the coordination tasks (ECOTEC 2006).  
3.2.2. How domestic institutional backgrounds shape ESF usages by local 
actors 
Since there was more room to manoeuvre in Spain, mainstream ESF funds could be used by 
some  jurisdictions  to  develop  employment  policies  which  opposed  those  developed  by 
governments at other levels.
23 For example, Catalonia supported plans for the promotion of 
equal opportunities within the business community. This activity could not have been funded 
with the ESF funds managed directly from Madrid, since they were supposed to be used for 
supporting public administrative bodies.
24  
The implementation of the EQUAL programme in Spain also offers evidence of competition 
between local authorities. The development of alternative employment policies has been used 
by city councils to increase their institutional legitimacy. This was affirmed very clearly by a 
policy officer from the Barcelona city council:  
‘The socialist city council feels that employment policies should be set at the 
local level (...) consequently, we assumed some tasks even if we had no legal 
authority  in  this  area.  We  do  not  have  any  money  to  implement  such 
activities, so an extraordinary effort is needed (...) We used the European 
Union to develop local employment policies, which is a domain where we 
had no authority...’
25 
The cases presented above are not exceptional. Table 5 shows that most of EQUAL projects 
implemented in 2002 by local authorities in Catalonia and Extremadura were managed by 
left-oriented  local  authorities.  These  projects  aimed  at  the  insertion  of  people  facing 
discrimination, such as women, migrants or poor suburb-dwellers. Non-profit groups in these 
regions also used European funds for similar purposes. 
In Catalonia, EQUAL was implemented by a variety of local actors to promote left-oriented 
employment policies which were not aligned to the more conservative regional preferences. 
                                                 
23 There are many examples in Spain where city councils decide to use EQUAL when the regional government 
has another political colour, for example in Badajoz, Malaga, Huelva, Lugo and La Coruña.  
24 Interview with a Catalan official responsible for the ESF management. 
25 Interview with an EQUAL project manager  at Barcelona Activa. In this specific case, the Barcelona city 
council was ruled by socialists while the regional government (in charge of employment policies) was ruled by 
conservatives and Christian democrats.  
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In contrast, most of the EQUAL projects (3 out of 5 in 2002) in Extremadura were managed 
directly  by  the  regional  government,  which  was  ruled  at  that  time  by  the  left.  A  clear 
leadership by the regional government is characteristic of several Spanish regions which used 
EQUAL as an additional resource to develop their own employment policies, which were not 
always aligned with the national priorities (ECOTEC 2006). Even if there was less room for 
local competition in Extremadura, the city of Badajoz managed to implement a project that 
clearly reflected a contrasting ideology. This local authority, similar to other economic and 
professional organizations, used the ESF money to attract firms or for the adaptation of the 
labour force to new economic trends. 
Table 5: The usages of EQUAL by local authorities 
  Catalonia  Extremadura  Pays de la Loire  Limousin 
 
Type of project 
coordinator 
19 local 
authorities 
12 local authorities  1 local authority 
 
1 local authority 
 
Ideology and 
projects 
6 out of 7 projects 
managed by left-
local authorities 
5 out of 6 projects 
managed by left-
local authorities  
The Nantes City 
council, ruled by 
PS 
Departement 
general Creuze, 
ruled by PS 
 
Relationships 
between 
regional and 
local authorities 
Competition 
between sub-
national 
governments 
Leadership by 
regional 
government 
Cooperation 
 
Cooperation  
 
  
Source: Elaborated by the author from information from the EQUAL database. 
Table  5  shows  that  only  a  minority  of  EQUAL  projects  were  implemented  by  local 
authorities in France. Given the key role of its centralised government, these political usages 
are less likely in France. Even if the regions can implement their own global grants, the 
nationally appointed prefet still plays a key role in their management and implementation 
(Ferry, Gross, Bachtler and McMaster 2007). Local authorities are obliged to negotiate with 
the central state and thus, they do not have much room to manoeuvre. European funds are 
also  tied  up  with  national  institutional  constraints  such  as  contracts  with  the  central 
government  (Smith  1997).  The  implementation  of  EQUAL  in  France  also  offers  a  clear 
illustration of this pervasive centralisation. France developed a category of ‘national’ projects 
which represent 19 % of the total, which is rather high compared to the percentage of projects 
implemented  at  the  regional  level.  The  projects  implemented  in  Pays  de  la  Loire  and 
Limousin are only respectively 3.3% and 1.3 % of the total (see Table 4). Additionally, in 
some regions, some so-called regional projects were led by entities based in Paris (6 out of 11 
analysed in Limousin).  EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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According to my interviews in Pays de la Loire, EQUAL funds were only used to support 
existing national policies such as the Local Plans for Employment (PLIES) or the ANPE. For 
example, the only local authority in charge of an EQUAL project in Pays de la Loire, the 
Nantes City Council, clearly defined it within the framework of the local PLIE. Likewise, the 
Limousin  region  was  closely  associated  with  many  activities  of  the  CREUS’AC  project 
coordinated by the Conseil general de la Creuse. Thus, this project was not designed on the 
basis of ideological considerations. It reflects ideologically neutral problems of the territory 
(e.g. in this case depopulation).  
Conclusion  
This article shows that the ESF can be employed to translate the Commission’s priorities into 
concrete actions. The combination of top-down Europeanisation with the usages of Europe 
offers  an  original  and  valuable  contribution  to  understanding  the  translation  process  at 
various  stages  of  the  policy  cycle.  This  approach  also  makes  it  possible  to  identify  the 
combination of causes that are jointly sufficient to translate Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals into 
domestic action through the ESF.  
First the article has shown how the Commission’s specification of Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals 
can be reflected in ESF operational programmes. Even if member states tend to support their 
own  policy  preferences  in  the  negotiation  process,  Commission  officials  can  still  use 
Lisbon/Europe 2020 goals to push for the integration of the Commission’s priorities (talking 
the EU talk). Commission officials at the French desk were very prone to push for changes 
given their European ideology. However, the integration of Commission’s priorities into the 
programming  documents  encountered  much  resistance  from  domestic  officials,  which 
constituted a major obstacle. Commission officials at the Spanish desk seemed to place less 
emphasis on promoting an EU added-value, but they could still push for the implementation 
of Commission’s priorities since domestic and European officials shared the same views on 
policy  solutions.  However,  domestic  changes  in  this  case  were  limited  by  high  rates  of 
unemployment in several regions. 
Secondly, this article has shown that Commission’s priorities can be translated into domestic 
agendas  through  the  ESF  (walking  the  walk).  This  outcome  is  much  more  likely  when 
European pressures are well-defined and specific, when there are facilitating factors and/or 
when the Commission has sufficient monitoring capacities. 
When European goals remain broad or ambiguous, the ESF has mostly been used to pursue 
the agenda of domestic actors. Our findings reveal considerable room for variation across 
countries. The usages of Europe differ in national contexts, and are affected by variables such 
as the level of economic development and the level of centralisation. In France, a pervasive 
centralisation leads to an implementation process rather consistent with national preferences. 
In Spain, there is much greater room to manoeuvre for local authorities, which has led to 
competition among employment policies at different levels of governance. This competition 
is not only apparent between the national government and regional governments, but is also 
visible among sub-national authorities. EIoP     © 2013 by Rosa Sanchez Salgado 
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Even if particular institutional factors that facilitated change in the past at the domestic level 
are absent in the current programming period (e.g. suppression of  Community initiatives, 
more flexible rules regarding evaluation), the ESF can still contribute to the implementation 
of Europe 2020 if European officials and domestic actors make use of its goals and the new 
institutional opportunities it offers (e.g. stronger country specific recommendations under the 
European semester).  
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